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THE THEOLOGY OF THE BLAINE
AMENDMENTS
RICHARD W. GARNETr*
INTRODUCTION
In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the Supreme Court of the
United States held that Ohio could, consistent with the First
Amendment, include religious schools in that State's pilot school-
choice program. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist
observed that "[t]he Ohio program is entirely neutral with respect
to religion. It provides benefits directly to a wide spectrum of
*Associate Professor Law, Notre Dame Law School. This Essay is based on
remarks offered at an outstanding conference sponsored by the Pew Forum on
Religion and Public Life and the First Amendment Law Review. The
conference, Separation of Church and States: An Examination of State
Constitutional Limits on Government Funding for Religious Institutions, was
held on March 28, 2003, at the University of North Carolina School of Law in
Chapel Hill, North Carolina. I received helpful suggestions and constructive
criticism from Tom Berg, Rev. John Coughlin, Fred Gedicks, John McGreevy,
Michael Perry, Michael Scaperlanda, and Steven Smith; and also from the
participants in a faculty workshop at the Arizona State University College of
Law.
I should note that I have discussed elsewhere, and in more detail, some of
the issues addressed in this Essay. See, e.g., Nicole Stelle Garnett & Richard
W. Garnett, School Choice, the First Amendment, and Social Justice, 4 TEx.
REV. L. & POL. 301 (2000); Richard W. Garnett, The Right Questions About
School Choice: Education, Religious Freedom, and the Common Good, 23
CARDOZO L. REV. 1281 (2002); Richard W. Garnett, The Story of Henry
Adams's Soul: Education and the Expression of Associations, 85 MINN. L. REV.
1841 (2001) [hereinafter Henry Adams]; Richard W. Garnett, Taking Pierce
Seriously: The Family, Religious Education, and Harm to Children, 76 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 109 (2000); Richard W. Gamett, Brown's Promise, Blaine's
Legacy, 17 CONST. COMM. 651 (2000) (reviewing JOSEPH P. VITERITrI,
CHOOSING EQUALITY: SCHOOL CHOICE, THE CONsTrrUTION, AND CIVIL
SOCIETY (1999)).
1. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
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individuals, defined only by financial need and residence in a
particular school district. It permits such individuals to exercise
genuine choice among options public and private, secular and
religious. 2  Accordingly, he concluded, Ohio had not
unconstitutionally established or endorsed religion merely by
permitting the program's low-income beneficiaries to direct their
scholarship funds to religious schools.
I believe that Ohio's voucher program is sound public
policy, that further choice-based education reform is warranted,
and that Zelman was both correctly decided and defensibly
reasoned.4 That is, the decision is consistent both with the relevant
precedents and with the better understandings of the history,
purpose, and meaning of the Establishment Clause.5 All that said,
it is worth remembering that the Supreme Court's decision
permitting us to experiment with school-choice programs-in
particular, with programs that include religious schools-does not
2. Id. at 662-63.
3. Such additional experimentation is already underway. See, e.g., Justin
Blum, Voucher Lessons Not Quite Complete, WASH. POST., May 4,2003, at C6
("Last week, in a sign of frustration with the slow pace of improvement of the
school system, D.C. Mayor Anthony A. Williams reversed his previous
opposition to vouchers and said he now believes they could offer hope for
some children who have been failed by the traditional public schools."); Ryan
Morgan, K-12 Voucher Win Lifts GOP Despite College Setback, DENV. POST,
May 4, 2003, at 2B (describing school voucher program recently enacted in
Colorado).
4. For a comprehensive analysis of the Zelman opinions-one that
embraces many of the Court's conclusions while criticizing some of its
arguments-see Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Zelman's Future: Vouchers,
Sectarian Providers, and the Next Round of Constitutional Battles, 78 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 917 (2003). Professor Tom Berg has also provided an excellent
review and analysis of the decision and its implications. Thomas C. Berg,
Vouchers and Religious Schools, The New Constitutional Questions, 72 U.
CINN. L. REV. 151, passim (2003).
5. I believe, however, that contemporary (i.e., post-Everson)
Establishment Clause doctrine reflects poorly that provision's "history,
purpose, and meaning." For a powerful argument that the Framers and
ratifiers intended the Establishment Clause merely to disable the new federal
government from interfering with the religion-related decisions of the states'
legislatures, see STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR
A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1995).
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compel the conclusion that we should so experiment. Zelman is
not, nor does it purport to be, the end of our public conversations
about education reform, public funds, and church-state relations.
Indeed, one of the virtues of Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion is
precisely that it invites further developments and deliberation, in
the chambers of our legislatures and in the courts of public opinion.
These conversations, acknowledged and anticipated in
Zelman, are worthy and important. Many believe that the case for
school choice sounds not only in the register of efficiency,
competition, and measurable outputs, but also in terms of authentic
pluralism, religious freedom, and social justice. Some fear, on the
other hand, that voucher programs will harm the low-income and
at-risk students they are intended to help, by diverting funds from
government schools. Still others worry that private and religious
education could undermine shared liberal values, impair the
inculcation of civic virtue, and threaten social cohesion.7 Again,
Zelman does not purport high-handedly to co-opt or pretermit the
discussion; rather, it "permits this debate to continue, as it should in
a democratic society,"' and as it does with this timely Symposium.
6. See, e.g., JOSEPH P. VITERITrI, CHOOSING EQUALITY: SCHOOL
CHOICE, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CIVIL SOCIETY (1999); Garnett, The Right
Questions About School Choice, supra note *; Michael W. McConnell,
Governments, Families, and Power: A Defense of Educational Choice, 31
CONN. L. REv. 847 (1999); John E. Coons, School Choice and Simple Justice,
FIRST THINGS, Apr. 1992, at 15.
7. A thoughtful op-ed by Senator Dianne Feinstein of California
illustrated and explored the concerns of many reasonable people about school
vouchers. Although she has "never before supported a voucher program,"
and believes that "we must continue to do everything we can to strengthen
and improve our nation's public schools," she believes also that "local leaders
should have the opportunity to experiment with programs that they believe
are right for their area," and that "[u]ltimately [the school-choice] issue is not
about ideology or political correctness. It is about providing a new
opportunity for good education, which is the key to success." Dianne
Feinstein, Let D.C. Try Vouchers, WASH. POST., July 22,2003, at A17.
8. Washington v. Glucksberg, 531 U.S. 702, 735 (1997) ("Throughout the
Nation, Americans are engaged in an earnest and profound debate about the
morality, legality, and practicality of physician assisted suicide. Our holding
permits this debate to continue, as it should in a democratic society."); cf.
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW
I.
Given recent cases like Agostini v. Felton9 and Mitchell v.
Helms,10 Zelman came as no surprise, either to those who welcomed
it, or to those for whom the decision is another step down a
dangerously misguided path. For this reason, perhaps, the ink was
barely dry on the slip opinions when commentators, scholars,
litigators, and activists took to the editorial pages, airwaves, and
email listservs, insisting that the "voucher wars"" are far from over.
In particular, it was widely noted that, in addition to the difficult
political task to come of convincing skeptical suburban voters and
wary legislators to embrace voucher programs, such experiments
continue to face formidable legal obstacles.12 (Again, the Court in
Zelman had no occasion to consider whether such schools must be
permitted to participate, on an equal footing with other private
schools, in voucher programs; the Justices decided only that they
may be included, consistent with the Constitution of the United
States.)" As the cognoscenti pointed out, the constitutions of nearly
forty States contain provisions that speak more directly-and, in
many cases, more restrictively- than does the First Amendment to
the flow of public funds to the "coffers"14 of religious schools.15
866-68 (1992) (joint opinion) (describing the "dimension present whenever
the Court's interpretation of the Constitution calls the contending sides of a
national controversy to end their national division by accepting a common
mandate rooted in the Constitution.").
9. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
10. 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
11. C. BOLICK, VOUCHER WARS: WAGING THE LEGAL BATFLE OVER
SCHOOL CHOICE (2003).
12. See, e.g., Mary Leonard, Private School Aid Efforts Will Face State
Challenges, BOSTON GLOBE, June 28, 2002, at A29 ("[Plolitical and legal
challenges in states still could impede moves to expand programs.... "); Jodie
Morse, A Victory for Vouchers, TIME, July 8, 2002, at 32 ("[A]head are more
court skirmishes.").
13. See, e.g., Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 4, at 955 ("Unlike those
landmark court decisions which terminate a government practice... Zelman is
merely permissive.... As such, its significance in American life will turn very
heavily on the political energies and legal phenomena which emerge in its
wake.").
14. The Justices have acquired the unfortunate habit in school-aid cases
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These provisions are commonly and generically called
"Blaine Amendments." 16 They take several forms, employ diverse
terms, and are interpreted and applied in different ways, with
varying effects. 7 Still, notwithstanding the important distinctions
that can and should be drawn among the various formulations, the
bottom line is fairly clear: In many cases, these state-law provisions,
if enforced, might well prohibit school-funding and other measures
that the Establishment Clause permits. In other words, although
the Court has ruled that voucher programs may, consistent with the
First Amendment's Establishment Clause, include religious schools,
the constitutions of many States seem clearly to provide-or, at
least, have been interpreted by courts to provide-that they may
not.
It is often argued-and at least one prominent court has so
of assuming that religious schools have "coffers" rather than, say, "checking
accounts." See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. at 695 (Souter, J.,
dissenting); Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 848 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Agostini, 521
U.S. at 228; Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 10 (1993).
15. See ERIC W. TREENE, THE GRAND FINALE IS JUST THE BEGINNING:
SCHOOL CHOICE AND THE COMING BATrLE OVER BLAINE AMENDMENTS 3
("Thirty-seven state constitutions have provisions placing some form of
restriction on government aid to religious schools beyond that in the United
States Constitution."), available at http://www.becketfund.org/other/
FedSocBlaineWP.html.pdf. (last visited Jan. 14, 2003).
For more on these provisions, see, for example, Steven K. Green, The
Blaine Amendment Reconsidered, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 38 (1992); Joseph P.
Viteritti, Blaine's Wake: School Choice, the First Amendment, and State
Constitutional Law, 21 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 657 (1998); and Toby J.
Heytens, Note, School Choice and State Constitutions, 86 VA. L. REV. 117
(2000).
16. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 4, at 960 ("Because of Senator [James
G.] Blaine's national influence. .. , these state provisions are now frequently
referred to generically-especially by their enemies-as the 'Blaine
Amendments.' ").
17. For a helpful taxonomy of the "Blaine Amendments," see The Pew
Forum on Religion and Public Life, School Vouchers: Settled Questions,
Continuing Disputes 7-8 (2002) (grouping the States' no-aid provisions into
three categories). See also Mark Edward DeForrest, An Evaluation of First
Amendment Objections to Blaine Amendment Language in State Constitutions,
26 HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 551 (2003).
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far held-that because state constitutions may neither authorize
nor permit that which the Constitution of the United States has
been interpreted to forbid,19 at least some of the Blaine
Amendments are, in at least some of their applications,
unconstitutional. In other words, the argument goes, because the
Free Speech Clause forbids "viewpoint discrimination" in the
disbursal of public-welfare benefits through forum-like programs;
and because the Equal Protection Clause does not permit
governments to deny such benefits on the basis of religion; and
because the Free Exercise Clause does not permit governments to
single out religious practice, belief, or institutions for special
disadvantage, no State may rely on its own constitution to justify
discrimination against religious schools and the beneficiaries who
choose them in the administration of a school-choice program.20
18. See Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 759-60 (9th Cir. 2002), cert.
granted, 123 S. Ct. 2075 (2003). I should note that I co-authored a brief amicus
curiae, filed on behalf of the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, the Catholic
League for Religious and Civil Rights, and numerous historians and legal
scholars in support of the Respondent in Davey.
19. See U.S. CONST. art. VI ("This Constitution... shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Cqnstitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding."); see also, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277-78
(1981) (rejecting argument that compliance with the State of Missouri's
arguably more restrictive constitutional provisions justified discrimination
against student groups and speakers on the basis of their religious speech and
activity); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 629 (1978) (holding that
discrimination against clergy was unconstitutional even though authorized by
the state constitution).
20. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 4, at 168.
Underlying these [federal constitutional] challenges [to
the Blaine Amendments] is a single argument: it is unjust
for a state to deny educational benefits, to which a child
or family would otherwise be entitled, because the family
chooses to educate the child in a religious setting or
integrate religious teaching into the schooling.
Id.
As Justice O'Connor put it:
[Tihe Religion Clauses-the Free Exercise Clause, the
Establishment Clause, the Religious Test Clause, Art. VI,
cl. 3, and the Equal Protection Clause as applied to
[Vol. 2
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Others have fleshed out and evaluated these arguments in
careful and critical detail; I will not do so here.21 Nor will I attempt
to describe or dissect the several lawsuits challenging various Blaine
Amendments' constitutional validity." Instead, with respect to
these arguments and challenges, I offer two brief observations:
First, I am convinced that when government enhances parents'
freedom of educational choice by disbursing financial aid through
religion-neutral programs, it respects, rather than undermines,
liberal and democratic values (properly understood). 2 Neither the
Constitution nor an appropriate care for civic virtue requires or
even countenances discrimination against religious belief,
24
expression, choices, and institutions. Thus, the arguments that the
religion-all speak with one voice on this point: Absent
the most unusual circumstances, one's religion ought not
affect one's legal rights or duties or benefits.
Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 715 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
21. See, e.g., Berg, supra note 4, at 168-208; Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 6,
at 957-72; Michael S. Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An
Equal Protection Approach to Establishment Clause Litigation, 61 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 311 (1986); Eugene Volokh, Equal Treatment Is Not
Establishment, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 341 (1999).
22. To cite just one example, the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty
recently filed a case, in the United States District Court for the District of
South Dakota, contending that South Dakota's Blaine Amendment "violates
federal constitutional guarantees against religious discrimination" and
therefore "should be struck down." Plaintiffs' Complaint at 1, Pucket v.
Rounds, Civ. No. 03-CV-5033 (D.S.D. filed Aug. 25, 2003),
http://www.becketfund.org/litigate/SD-BlaineComplaint.pdf (on file with First
Amendment Law Review). In addition, the United States Supreme Court has
heard oral argument this session to address the alleged conflict between the
Washington Constitution's no-aid provision and the First Amendment. See
Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 759-60 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct.
2075 (2003).
23. See generally, e.g., WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PLURALISM: THE
IMPLICATIONS OF VALUE PLURALISM FOR POLITICAL THEORY AND PRACTICE
(2002); Michael W. McConnell, Education Disestablishment. Why Democratic
Values Are Ill-Served by Democratic Control of Schooling, in, MORAL AND
POLITICAL EDUCATION (Stephen Macedo et al. eds., American Society for
Political and Legal Philosophy, Nomos 43, 2002); Michael W. McConnell, The
New Establishmentarianism, 75 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 453 (2000).
24. See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 21, at 351 ("[M]y sense of the Framers'
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Blaine Amendments are unconstitutional to the extent they purport
to prohibit the non-discriminatory treatment of religion in the
context of public-welfare programs strike me as plausible, and even
compelling.
My second observation is offered in response to what might
be called the "federalism defense" of the Blaine Amendments.
Assume for now that many of the States' Blaine Amendments
prohibit religion-inclusive school-choice programs that the
Establishment Clause would permit. So what? Let a thousand
flowers bloom! Remember, for example, Justice Brandeis's
celebrated observation that "[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the
federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country."25 What about
Justice Brennan's passionate defense of rights-protecting localism
and his plea that state courts correct the Supreme Court's
conservative turn by using their own States' constitutions to raise
the barrier between the government's aims and individual rights?2
And, did not even Justice Thomas-surely a reliable opponent of
anti-religious discrimination-write separately in Zelman precisely
to urge courts in Religion Clause cases to "strike a proper balance
between the demands of the Fourteenth Amendment on the one
hand and the federalism prerogatives of States on the other"?2
And so, a federalism-loving defender of the Blaine Amendments
might ask, aren't the attacks on these provisions-particularly when
worldview is that they did not think the government was required to
discriminate against religion.").
25. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
26. See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the
States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61
N.Y.U. L. REv. 535 (1986); William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the
Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489 (1977). According to
Professor Lawrence Friedman, Justice Brennan's defense of judicial
federalism has "suffered criticism for its programmatic, result-oriented cast."
Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional Value of Dialogue and the New
Judicial Federalism, 28 HASTINGS CON. L. Q. 93, 94 (2001).
27. Davey, 299 F.3d at 768 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (quoting Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 679 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring)).
[Vol. 2
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pressed by those who claim to support school choice as an exercise
in de-centralization-misplaced attempts at homogenizing the
existing healthy diversity of approaches to educational funding and
church-state relations?2'
I do not think so. Yes, the Rehnquist Court has done much
to bring back to our constitutional-law conversations an
appreciation for the role and prerogatives of the States, and for the
notion that the federal Constitution is a "charter for a government
of limited and enumerated powers[.] ' '29 It is true that contemporary
scholars are taking a fresh look at the works of localist thinkers
from Tocquevile to Tiebout," and that "subsidiarity"' seems to be
28. See, e.g., Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 4, at 966 ("[W]e believe that each
state should be free to make its own constitutional policy of church-state
relations, and to extend it beyond the federal policy, so long as the state
approach serves reasonable purposes of the sort associated with the regime of
Separationism."). Professors Lupu and Tuttle have devoted impressive efforts
to identifying such "reasonable purposes," and rehabilitating this "regime."
Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in
Our Constitutional Order, 47 VILL. L. REv. 37 (2002); Ira C. Lupu & Robert
W. Tuttle, Sites of Redemption: A Wide-Angle Look at Government Vouchers
and Sectarian Service Providers, 18 J.L. & POL. 539 (2002). But see, e.g.,
PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 491-92 (2002)
(concluding "the history of separation between church and state cannot be
understood simply as the history of religious liberty and its protection by
American institutions. On the contrary,... separation became a popular
vision of religious liberty in response to deeply felt fears of ecclesiastical and
especially Catholic authority.").
29. Richard W. Garnett, The New Federalism, the Spending Power, and
Federal Criminal Law, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 1 (2003). See generally, John 0.
McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville's America: The Rehnquist Court's
Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REv. 485 (2002) (arguing that
the approach of the Rehnquist Court to federalism reveals skepticism toward
centralization). But, see, e.g., ROBERT F. NAGEL, THE IMPLOSION OF
AMERICAN FEDERALISM 30 (2001) (arguing "[w]hat Lopez confirms is that
the national government is for all practical purposes already a government of
general regulatory powers and that.., there is little that the judiciary can be
expected to do about it").
30. See generally Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local
Expenditures, 64 J. POL. EcoN. 416 (1956) (exemplifying Tiebout's localist
theory and suggesting an economic justification for state sovereignty).
31. "Subsidiarity" is "the principle of leaving social tasks to the smallest
social unit that can perform them adequately." Mary Ann Glendon, Civil
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW
the watchword in political theory. Nevertheless, the better course is
to treat the Blaine Amendments not as liberty-enhancing
experiments,3 2 but rather as precisely the kind of discriminatory
provisions that-principles of judicial federalism and enumerated
powers notwithstanding-the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment have removed from the menu of local legislative
options. Even full-throated support for the present federalism
revival does not require one to regard these provisions as
"courageous" efforts by particular communities to provide greater
protection to religious freedom, by insisting on a more rigid
"separation of church and state." In fact, the Blaine Amendments
might better be seen as representing the failures of particular
communities to fully appreciate the nature, demands, and
implications of religious freedom and liberal pluralism.
More particularly, and perhaps more prosaically, it is hard
to see how the proffered "laboratories of democracy" defense can
avoid foundering on the Supremacy Clause.33 After all, federalism
does not mean that the States cannot lose or may do whatever they
please; it means that there are judicially enforceable limits even on
the far-reaching regulatory and other powers of the government of
Service, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 1, 1996, at 39, 40 (reviewing MICHAEL J.
SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC
PHILOSOPHY (1996)). Similarly, in the Catholic Social Thought tradition,
subsidiarity is the principle according to which "a community of a higher order
should not interfere in the internal life of a community of a lower order,
depriving the latter of its functions, but rather should support it in case of need
and help to co-ordinate its activity with the activities of the rest of society,
always with a view to the common good." Pope John Paul II, Centesimus
Annus [Hundredth Anniversary] 48 (1991) (encyclical letter on the
hundredth anniversary of Rerum Novarum).
32. See DeForrest, supra note 17, at 573-76; cf Davey, 299 F.3d at 761
(McKeown, J., dissenting) ("[W]e must start where the State of Washington
began over a hundred years ago.., when it defined its vision of religious
freedom as one completely free of governmental interference .. . ."). In fact,
Washington was required by the 1889 Enabling Act-that is, by the Congress
of the United States-to include a Blaine-type amendment in its constitution.
See Act of Feb. 22, 1889, ch. 180, sec. 4, 25 Stat. 676, 677 (1889).
33. U.S. CONST. art. VI ("This Constitution... shall be the supreme Law
of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing
in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
[Vol. 2
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the United States. And so, if we assume that the States' no-aid
provisions are inconsistent with the equal-treatment and non-
discrimination principles discussed and applied in the Court's Free
Speech, Free Exercise, and Equal Protection precedents, the case
for the Blaine Amendments as plucky experiments in stricter
separation seems doomed. After all, a State would not likely
succeed with the argument that its own experiment with a more
communitarian or public-safety-oriented approach to the balance
between privacy and law-enforcement needs should permit a
federalism-based dispensation from the Court's Fourth
Amendment case law. What is it, then, about super-separationism
that should permit it to trump-or, more technically, to serve as a
"compelling state interest" sufficient to authorize intrusions upon-
fundamental free-exercise, free-speech, and equal-treatment rights?
Justice Brennan was correct, of course, to remind us that the States
are free to provide through their own constitutions greater
protection to individuals from government than does the Bill of
Rights. But while it is fairly easy to see that the Constitution
provides a floor, not a ceiling, in the context of consent searches, it
is far from obvious that the States may provide extra "protection"
to citizens from "establishments" of religion if, in so doing, they
purport to authorize violations of rights protected by the First
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause.35
34. Absent some conflict with a constitutionally protected right, and
absent the authorization in state law of government action at least arguably
prohibited by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, then of course the states
ought to be able to experiment, and to go their own way, in matters of
education funding (subject, of course, to the no-establishment floor imposed
by the First Amendment).
35. There are good reasons to believe that the Establishment Clause,
unlike the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses, would today be better
understood not so much as an individual-rights provision, whose protection
individuals may invoke when they are aggrieved by excessively religious state
action, but as a "structural" provision that promotes religious liberty by
forbidding, inter alia, institutional entanglements between religious
communities and government agencies. See, e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, The
Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on Government Power, 84 IOWA
L. REv. 2 (1998) (considering whether the primary function of the
Establishment Clause is to secure individual rights or to restrain government
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW
Now, it can and should be conceded that a State's desire to
construct a higher "wall of separation 3 6 than is required by the
First Amendment, by insisting on more rigid limitations upon the
flow of once-public money to religious institutions and uses, is not
necessarily an invidious one (unlike, for example, a State's desire to
experiment with de jure segregation in schools). There is no need
to dispute that there might be "reasonable purposes.., associated
with the regime of Separationism." 37 By the same token, though, it
might be "reasonable" to prefer enhanced security and improved
law enforcement capabilities over warrant requirements,
exclusionary rules, and Miranda warnings. But even "reasonable
purposes" are not generally thought to justify the denial of
constitutionally protected fundamental rights.
Returning, then, to Justice Brandeis's tribute to local
experimentation, the best response might be the one offered by
Chief Justice Rehnquist in the recent Boy Scouts case." Justice
Stevens had turned to Justice Brandeis in defense of New Jersey's
application of its anti-discrimination laws to the Boy Scouts'
39internal policies regarding homosexuality. Putting aside for now
the difficult question whether this application infringed the Scouts'
power); Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint:
Validations and Ramifications, 18 J. LAW & POL. 445 (2003) (arguing that the
Supreme Court has interpreted the Establishment Clause as a limitation on
government power over religious matters); cf. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536
U.S. 639, 679 n.4 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that the Free Exercise
Clause, "unlike the Establishment Clause[,] protects individual liberties of
religious worship").
36. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (citing Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)); cf. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S.
203, 247 (1948) (Reed, J., dissenting) ("A rule of law should not be drawn
from a figure of speech.").
37. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 4, at 966. Again, however, Professor
Hamburger's study suggests that church-state "separation" in the United
States owes as much to anti-religious ideology, and anti-Catholic theology, as
to any such purposes. See HAMBURGER, supra note 28, passim.
38. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
39. Id. at 664 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Because every state law
prohibiting discrimination is designed to replace prejudice with principle,
Justice Brandeis' comment on the States' right to experiment with 'things
social' is directly applicable to this case.").
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First Amendment rights, Chief Justice Rehnquist's remarks
concerning the balance between local experimentation and the
protection of fundamental rights seems on point: "Justice Brandeis,
a champion of state experimentation in the economic realm,... was
never a champion of state experimentation in the suppression of
free speech. To the contrary, his First Amendment commentary
provides compelling support for the [Boy Scouts' position] in this,40
case." Or, as Professor Viteritti has put it:
Diversity is expected under our system of
judicial federalism. It is problematic, however,
when state courts impose limitations on the
free exercise of religion that transgress
constitutional guidelines set down by the Court.
Our system of federalism permits states to
define state rights more broadly than analogous
federal rights but not to abridge those liberties
• . 41
that are protected by the Constitution.
At least at the level of constitutional doctrine, then, the
"federalism" defense of the Blaine Amendments fails. But
Professor Viteritti's statement points to another, broader defense of
these provisions, one that also draws on the Court's federalism
decisions: The argument of the Blaine Amendments' defenders is
not simply that, as a matter of positive law, the States are
authorized to experiment with a higher wall of separation, even at
the expense of (possible) burdens on individuals' equal-treatment
rights. Rather, the claim is also that such experimentation, and the
diversity in church-state relations that results, ought to be
permitted.42
40. Id. at 660-61.
41. Joseph P. Viteritti, Choosing Equality: Religious Freedom and
Educational Opportunity Under Constitutional Federalism, 15 YALE L. &
POL'Y REv. 113, 160 (1996).
42. See, e.g., Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 768 (9th Cir. 2002)
(McKeown, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 2075 (2003).
No less than the State of Ohio's decision to fund students'
sectarian education, which the Court endorsed in Zelman,
the State of Washington's decision not to 'experiment' in
the funding of religious indoctrination should represent an
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This normative dimension to the Amendments' defense is
entirely appropriate and, for the most part, consistent with the tone
and leading themes of the New Federalism generally." Indeed,
Professor Chemerinsky has observed that "[o]ne of the most
frequently advanced justifications for federalism is that the division
of power between federal and state governments advances
liberty."" Federalism, in other words, is about more than
efficiency, competition, experimentation, and diversity; it is also, in
the end, about securing freedom.
So, perhaps I was too quick to reject the "Blaine
Amendments as courageous experiments" claim. The present
Court's understanding of federalism might seem, at first blush
45
anyway, to weigh in favor of tolerating some States' decisions to
find their own way on matters of no-aid separationism. At the
same time, I suspect that few would maintain that the fracturing
and diffusion of power necessarily produces "more" liberty or
46better promotes authentic human flourishing. In any event, it
equally valid concern -both as a matter of federalism and
with respect to the more explicit limitations of the
Religion Clauses.
Id.
43. See generally Garnett, supra note 29.
44. Erwin Chemerinsky, Does Federalism Advance Liberty?, 47 WAYNE
L. REV. 911, 911 (2001).
45. On the other hand, the fact that several of the States were required
by the United States-notwithstanding the failure of the Blaine Amendment
at the federal level-to adopt their strict no-aid provisions, seems to point in
the other direction. See generally Joseph P. Viteritti, Blaine's Wake: School
Choice, the First Amendment, and State Constitutional Law, 21 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 657, 672-73 (1998).
46. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 44, at 913 ("[T]he Supreme
Court's federalism decisions are 'rights regressive' - that is, they limit rather
than enhance individual liberties. [Also,] as a more theoretical matter there is
no reason to believe that federalism will increase freedom."); Douglas
Laycock, Federalism as a Structural Threat to Liberty, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 67, 80 (1998).
It is hardly news that there is a conflict between states'
rights and federal protections for liberty. If a state
violates a citizen's liberty, and if the federal government
attempts to protect the citizen's liberty, then any residuum
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seems appropriate to ask not simply whether these Amendments
are permissible departures from a federal baseline, but also whether
they contribute to one purported "end game" of federalism-
namely, promoting the freedom and dignity of the human person.47
In my view, federalism's normative content and functions
provide little support for the Blaine Amendments. This is certainly
not to say that religious freedom goes unprotected, and must
languish, in a legal regime of church-state separation. (By the same
token, religious freedom can survive and thrive in a regime of "mild
and equitable"4' religious establishments.49) Rather, the claim is
that whatever marginal increase in religious freedom might attend
the operation of a local rule forbidding absolutely even the indirect
flow of public funds to religious institutions is more than offset by
the harms caused to that freedom by subjecting beneficiaries and
their educational choices to special disabilities. The meaningful
ability to pursue a religious education, for oneself or for one's
children, would seem a crucial component of any attractive account
of religious freedom.50 Thus, as John Courtney Murray once
of states' rights may limit the effectiveness of the federal
protection. This sort of conflict between federalism and
liberty is most pronounced when a rogue state or region is
deeply opposed to a liberty to which the nation as a whole
is committed.
Id.
47. See, e.g., Viteritti, supra note 41, at 160 ("Judicial activism at the state
level is a welcome phenomenon only to the extent that it makes for a freer
society.").
48. John Witte, Jr., "A Most Mild and Equitable Establishment": John
Adams and the Massachusetts Experiment, 41 J. CHURCH & ST. 213 (1999).
49. See MICHAEL J. PERRY, UNDER GOD? RELIGIOUS FAITH AND
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 30, 45 (2003) ("[I]f a constitution vigorously protects
the free exercise of religion, then the fact that it does not forbid government to
establish religion does not imperil anyone's human rights.").
50. See, e.g., Second Vatican Council, Dignitatis Humanae [Declaration
on Religious Freedom] 2 (1965), available at http://www.vatican.va/
archive/histcouncils/iivatican council/documents/
vat-iidecl_19651207_dignitatis-humanaeen.html.
It is in accordance with their dignity as persons ... that all
men should be at once impelled by nature and also bound
by a moral obligation to seek the truth, especially
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observed, when "separation as an absolute principle"-i.e., of the
kind enshrined in many States' no-aid provisions51 -"is ruthlessly
thrust into the field of education, the result is juridical damage to
the freedom of religion." 52
In sum, the Supreme Court's present understanding of the
Establishment Clause -particularly its awareness that the
institutional and juridical separation of church and state need not
be conflated with discrimination in the disbursal of public benefits
or the operation of public forums-arguably facilitates and protects
the freedom of religion. The States' ersatz experiments with rigid
no-aid separationism-notwithstanding their defenders' misplaced
reliance on Justice Brandeis, diversity, and federalism-do not.
II.
In fact, the Blaine Amendments were not simply local
experiments with recalibrated church-state relations,5 and they
illustrate more than the diversity of possible approaches to funding
public education or constructing "walls of separation." Instead, the
Amendments were primarily the products of widespread concern
about the political and cultural effects of what were thought to be
the teachings and ambitions of the Roman Catholic Church, of
religious truth. They are also bound to adhere to the
truth, once it is known, and to order their whole lives in
accord with the demands of truth.
Id.
51. This "separation as an absolute principle" can and should be
distinguished from other notions of separation-for example, the idea of
"separationism as a tradition." See Steve D. Smith, Separation as a Tradition,
18 J.L. & POL. 215 (2002).
52. John Courtney Murray, Law or Prepossessions?, 14 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 23,40 (1949).
53. Cf Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748, 762, 768 (9th Cir. 2002) (McKeown,
J., dissenting) (referring to "Washington's longstanding practice of prohibiting
religious funding as a matter of encouraging the unfettered free exercise of
religion," "Washington's decision not to 'experiment' in the funding of
religious indoctrination" and asserting that "Washington's decision not to fund
religious education simply reflects its strong desire.., to insulate itself from
the appearance of endorsing religion"), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 2075 (2003).
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liberal anti-clericalism more generally, and also of a less considered,
virulent "Maria Monk"-style hostility54 toward the Church's
traditions, clergy, schools, and immigrant members." To be sure,
and notwithstanding the Amendments' often unsavory origins and
premises, their "social meaning" has evolved.56  We should
therefore avoid reducing them simplistically to the paranoia of the
Know Nothings or to the Republican, Protestant triumphalism of
Thomas Nast's Harper's Weekly illustrations. It remains the case,
54. See MARIA MONK, THE AWFUL DISCLOSURES OF MARA MONK
(1836); see also Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment
Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085,
1119 & n.156 (1995). As Professor Lash reports, this infamous account of
kidnapping, sexual perversion, and child murder in a "nunnery" was a
"runaway best seller;" indeed, "[n]o other book in America sold more copies
until the publication of Uncle Tom's Cabin."
55. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828-29 (2000) (plurality
opinion); Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606, 624 (Ariz. 1999); Lupu & Tuttle,
supra note 4, at 959 ("These provisions have a common and troubled historical
provenance; virtually all of them seem to have been a product of Protestant-
Catholic conflict over education in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries."); Treene, supra note 15, at 4 ("[The Blaine Amendments] were a
direct result of the nativist, anti-Catholic bigotry that was a recurring theme in
American politics throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries."). For more
detailed discussions of the connections between the Common School
movement and the various no-aid Amendments, on the one hand, and
nineteenth (and twentieth) century nativism and anti-Catholicism, on the
other, see, for example, CHARLES LESLIE GLENN, THE MYTH OF THE
COMMON SCHOOL (1988); HAMBURGER, supra note 28; LLOYD P.
JORGENSON, THE STATE AND THE NON-PUBLIC SCHOOL: 1825-1925 (1987);
JOHN T. McGREEVY, CATHOLICISM AND AMERICAN FREEDOM (2003); and
VITERrrrI, supra note 6.
56. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, Reconstructing the Blaine Amendments,
2 FIRST. AMEND. L. REV. 85 (2003).
57. Throughout the post-Civil War years, rapacious popes and priests,
bent on weakening America by, inter alia, destroying its public schools and its
separationist, and Protestant, traditions, figured prominently in Nast's work.
For examples, see RAY ALLEN BILLINGTON, THE PROTESTANT CRUSADE
1800-1860: A STUDY OF THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN NATISM (1938)
(illustrations); JORGENSON, supra note 55, at 113; and MCGREEVY, supra note
55, at 94, 97. In addition, several of Nast's anti-Catholic cartoons are available
online. See, e.g., Anti Catholic Nativism (Roland Marchand, ed.), at
http://historyproject.ucdavis.edu/imageapp.php?Major=RE&Minor=D (last
visited Jan. 17, 2004); Ohio State Univ. Libraries, Thomas Nast, at
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however, that the Blaine Amendments reflected more than
reactionary nativism or a principled dedication to the protection of
religious liberty through no-aid separationism. They cannot be
fully understood without reference to the irreducibly anti-Catholic
ideology that inspired and sustained them."
It would be a mistake, however, as we think about the
meaning and message of these no-aid provisions, to focus too
closely on Maria Monk and Thomas Nast, on the Know Nothings
and the Ku Klux Klan, or even on Horace Mann and James Blaine.
Such emphases would be misguided, and not only because they
could blind us to real changes over the years in the Amendments'
social meaning, but also because antipathy toward the Roman
Catholic Church and deep-seated disagreement with that Church's
pronouncements and perceived teachings shaped our culture,
discourse, and laws well before, and long after, the immigration
booms and school wars of the Nineteenth and early Twentieth
Centuries.
Arthur Schlesinger, Sr., once wrote that "prejudice" against
the Catholic Church is "the deepest bias in the history of the
American people."'' Setting aside for now the question whether
this attitude is best characterized as a "prejudice" or "bias," there is
no getting around the fact that, from the Puritans to the Framers
http://www.lib.ohio-state.edu/cgaweb/nast/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2004).
58. It should be emphasized that the doctrinal arguments against the
Blaine Amendments-i.e., the constitutional arguments that they may not be
used to require the exclusion from public welfare programs of otherwise
eligible religious believers and institutions-do not depend on the
amendments' historical origins in xenophobia, prejudice, and religious
disagreement. It could well be that the discriminatory motives and purposes
of those who enacted the laws, combined also with the laws' continuing
discriminatory effects, provide adequate grounds for striking them down. See,
e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 223 (1985) ("Without deciding
whether [section] 182 would be valid if enacted today without any
impermissible motivation, we simply observe that its original enactment was
motivated by a desire to discriminate against blacks on account of race and the
section continues to this day to have that effect."). For a detailed analysis and
critique of this line of argument, see, for example, Lupu & Tuttle, supra note
4, at 969-70. In any event, the doctrinal arguments sketched by Professor
Berg and others are powerful, wholly and apart from these motives and aims.
59. JOHN TRACY ELLIS, AMERICAN CATHOLICISM 151 (2d ed. 1969).
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and beyond, anti-"popery" was thick in the cultural air breathed by
the early Americans, who were raised on tales of Spanish Armadas
and Inquisitions, Puritan heroism and Bloody Mary, Jesuit schemes
and Gunpowder Plots, and lecherous confessors and baby killing60)
nuns. American anti-Catholicism was not simply a reaction to
Irish immigration, Tammany-style corruption, or the anti-liberal
Syllabus of Errors. It arrived on the Mayflower and with Foxe's
Book of Martyrs;" it was preached by Williams and Whitefield; and1 2
it helped to inspire the Revolution. It went beyond the legal
penalties imposed upon, and disabilities endured by, Catholics in
the American colonies and States." Rather, in keeping with
traditions, debates, and premises that crossed the Atlantic with the
60. See, e.g., BILLINGTON, supra note 57, at 1.
Hatred of Catholics and foreigners had been steadily
growing in the United States for more than two centuries
before it took political form with the Native American
outburst of the 1840's and the Know-Nothingism of the
1850's. These upheavals could never have occurred had
not the American people been so steeped in antipapal
prejudice that they were unable to resist the nativistic
forces of their day.
Id.
61. A prominent historian of religion has noted that "John Foxe did as
much as anyone to fire the anti-Catholic spirit that the English needed to spur
them to mission and conquest.... He resolved to fight the pope and Queen
Mary by writing Actes and Monuments, also known as The Book of Martyrs,
which was full of gruesome stories about how Catholics persecuted faithful
servants of Christ." MARTIN E. MARTY, PILGRIMS IN THEIR OWN LAND: 500
YEARS OF RELIGION IN AMERICA 45 (1984).
62. The Quebec Act of 1774 granted free exercise of religion to Roman
Catholics living in Canada. Typical of the American reaction is this short
poem, quoted by Professor Stokes: "If Gallic Papists have a right / To worship
their own way / Then farewell to the Liberties / Of poor America." ANSON
PHELPS STOKES, 1 CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 260 (1950).
Or, as Boston firebrand Samuel Adams insisted, "much more is to be dreaded
from the growth of Popery in America, than from Stamp-Acts or any other
Acts destructive of men[']s civil rights." Id. at 261.
63. See Peter H. Schuck, The Perceived Values of Diversity, Then and
Now, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1915, 1925 (2001) ("Indeed, before the
Revolutionary War, every colony enacted anti-Catholic laws restricting certain
religious practices, public and private activities, and some other rights
attached to common citizenship.").
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colonists and their culture, Americans' thinking about religious
freedom, and religious faith itself, was in no small measure shaped
and defined in reaction and opposition to the Roman "Whore of
Babylon" and all her works."'
In addition, Professors Hamburger, McGreevy, and others
have reminded us that anti-Catholicism remained a powerful force
in American life -particularly in the circles of the political, legal,
and cultural elites-well after Blaine and the Know Nothings
shuffled off the political stage.61 If anti-"popery" helped shape
American ideology in the Colonies and at the Founding, then, as
McGreevy puts it, "discussion of Catholicism [also] ... helped to
define the terms of mid-twentieth century liberalism."6 More
64. Of course, it is neither possible nor necessary in this Essay fully to
document these claims. It is, perhaps, a testament to the pervasiveness of anti-
Catholicism in early America that, even today, so much of what "every school-
child knows"-if they know anything at all-about the matters and actors
mentioned in this paragraph tracks, more or less, colonial Protestant
narratives. In any event, as one historian has observed:
In every American colony.... specific test laws or the
possibility of being challenged to subscribe to a test or
oath of abjuration, with refusal leading to prosecution as a
'popish recusant,' ensured the exclusion of Catholics from
public life. Even more than these statutes, a pervasive
opinion that 'Popery' was synonymous with tyranny
relegated Catholics to a position beyond the realm of
acceptability.
THOMAS J. CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA
TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 80 (1986). For more detailed
discussions of attitudes and actions toward Catholics, and of religious freedom
more generally, in early America, see, for example, BILLINGTON, supra note
57; GERARD V. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA
(1987); HAMBURGER, supra note 28, at 21-89; MARTY, supra note 61, at 41-
166; STOKES, supra note 62; and JOHN WRIrE, JR., RELIGION AND THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT: ESSENTIAL RIGHTS AND
LIBERTIES (2000).
65. See HAMBURGER, supra note 28; MCGREEVY, supra note 55; see also
MARTY, supra note 61, at 337-426; ; Thomas C. Berg, Anti-Catholicism and
Modern Church-State Relations, 33 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 121 (2001); Barbara
Welter, From Maria Monk to Paul Blanshard: A Century of Protestant Anti-
Catholicism, in R. BELLAH & F. GREENSPAHN, UNCIVIL RELIGION:
INTERRELIGIOUS HOSTILrrY IN AMERICA (1987).
66. John T. McGreevy, Thinking on One's Own: Catholicism in the
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generally, the revival of the Ku Klux Klan in the 1920's, and that
organization's agitation-in the name of, among other things, the
"separation of church and state"-in opposition to Catholic
parochial schools; the anxieties prompted across the Nation by
Governor Al Smith's presidential campaigns; the judgment of
prominent public intellectuals like Santayana, Dewey, and
Lippmann that Catholicism was "hostile to democracy and to every
force that tended to make people self-sufficient";67 academic and
other arguments, inspired by Fr. Coughlin's demagoguery,
widespread Catholic anti-Semitism, and the Church's apparent
support of Franco in Spain, linking Catholicism with totalitarian
governments and authoritarian personalities; and, of course, Paul
Blanchard's runaway best sellers, American Freedom and Catholic
Power and Communism, Democracy, and Catholic Power, which
called for popular resistance to Catholic and Soviet aggression
alike, are only a few illustrations and highlights of what was for
decades a pervasive and dominant cultural theme: Namely, that
there is a vast chasm, one that liberal institutions cannot safely
ignore, "between the presuppositions of a free society and the
inflexible authoritarianism of the Catholic religion." 69
Law both follows and shapes culture, so it should come as
no surprise that this longstanding and widespread opposition to the
perceived agenda and teachings of the Catholic Church influenced
the incorporation and interpretation of the Establishment Clause.70
As Professor McGreevy reminds us, the Everson and McCollum
decisions-the twin fountainheads of constitutionalized strict-
American Intellectual Imagination, 1928-1960, 84 J. AM. HIST. 97, 98 (1997).
67. Id. at 102 (quoting WALTER LIPPMAN, DRIFT AND MASTERY: AN
ATrEMrT TO DIAGNOSE THE CURRENT UNREST 115 (1961)).
68. "In their famous 1950 study of the connection between psychological
tendencies and political views, The Authoritarian Personality, Theodor
Adorno and his colleagues clearly included Catholics when they warned of
overly restrictive, religious families whose children might channel their
frustration into fascist politics." McGreevy, supra note 66, at 118.
69. Id. at 98 (quoting REINHOLD NEIBUHR, THE CHILDREN OF LIGHT
AND THE CHILDREN OF DARKNESS: A VINDICATION OF DEMOCRACY AND A
CRITIQUE OF ITS TRADITIONAL DEFENSE 128 (1944)).
70. See HAMBURGER, supra note 28, at 449-78; MCGREEvY, supra note
55, at 183-86; Berg, supra note 65, at 127-32.
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separationism-are best understood if placed "in the context of an
ongoing discussion about Catholicism and democracy."71  To be
clear: the point is not merely that several Justices at mid-century
were sympathetic to Blanchard's claims and concerns, or even that
Justice Hugo Black-the lead voice in both cases-was a former
Klansman who remained anti-Catholic.72  It is, instead, that
Everson's historical and theoretical premises, and the body of legal
doctrine these premises inspired and produced, were both
reactionary and aggressive. They reflected elite reactions to and
fears about Catholicism's aims and effects, as well as a
determination to counter them through law.7' Even twenty years
after Everson-well after President Kennedy's election,
Archbishop Sheen's genial television presence, and the Second
Vatican Council are often supposed to have to put our Nation's
"deepest bias" to rest-the "residual anti-Catholicism" 74 of Justices
Black and Douglas, expressed in landmark cases like Allen and
• 71
Lemon, remained palpable.
It is a project for another day to explore fully the extent to
71. McGreevy, supra note 66, at 122.
72. See HUGO T. BLACK, MY FATHER: A REMEMBRANCE 104 (1975)
("He suspected the Catholic Church. He used to read all of Paul Blanchard's
books exposing power abuse in the Catholic Church."); see also HAMBURGER,
supra note 28, at 422-34 (documenting Black's relationship with the Klan
during the 1920s); Berg, supra note 65, at 127-32 (discussing how Black's
distrust of Catholicism manifests in his judicial opinions.
73. See HAMBURGER, supra note 28, at 454-92.
74. Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality,
46 EMORY L.J. 43, 58 (1997).
75. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 630-31 (1971) (Douglas,
J., concurring) (claiming that Catholic schools "give the church the
opportunity to indoctrinate its creed delicately and indirectly, or massively
through doctrinal courses"); id. at 636 (quoting approvingly an anti-Catholic
tract, L. BOETrNER, ROMAN CATHOLICISM 375 (1962), for the proposition
that "the people who support a parochial school have no voice at all in [its]
affairs"); Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 260 n.9 (1968) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (warning of a "creeping sectarianism [that] avoids the direct
teaching of religious doctrine but keeps the student continually reminded of
the sectarian orientation of his education"); id. at 251 (Black, J., dissenting)
(warning of "powerful sectarian religious propagandists.., looking toward
complete domination and supremacy of their particular brand of religion").
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which settled First Amendment principles and premises can be seen
as the remnants of centuries of Anglo-American reaction and
76
opposition to Catholic doctrine and culture. Nor is this an
appropriate occasion to evaluate the claim that anti-Catholicism is
spent as a force in American culture or constitutional law.77 For
now, the claim is only that we ought to take care, in our discussions
76. Professor Hamburger has provided such an exploration in his recent
work. See HAMBURGER, supra note 28, at 480 ("Separation became a
substantial part of American conceptions of religious liberty only in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when Americans felt growing fears of
churches, especially the Catholic Church."); id. at 483 ("The separation of
church and state not only departed from the religious liberty guaranteed by
the U.S. Constitution but also undermined this freedom."); id. at 488 ("[O]ften
with an eye on the Supreme Court, advocates of separation have contributed
to a huge semihistorial literature that blurs together different types of early
American religious liberty under the rubric of separation.").
77. See Berg, supra note 65, at 168, 169 (noting that, although "explicit
dislike of Catholicism continues to appear in church-state debates," this dislike
"does not play the overwhelming role in church-state debates that it did in the
1940s and 1950s"); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 4, at 994 ("The pervasive anti-
Catholic sentiment that drove Separationism from the 1940s to the 1980s is
well behind us .... "). For a recent argument that anti-Catholicism remains a
potent cultural force, see PHILIP JENKINS, THE NEW ANI-CATHOLICISM: THE
LAST ACCEPTABLE PREJUDICE 1-22, 207-16 (2003). In a similar vein, see
generally MARK S. MASSA, ANTI-CATHOLICISM IN AMERICA: THE LAST
ACCEPTABLE PREJUDICE (2003) (discussing a resurgence of anti-Catholic
sentiment in the last quarter of the twentieth century). Peter Steinfels recently
observed that:
Yes, anti-Catholic animus rooted in the theological
polemics of the 16' century Reformation still exists in the
United States. But the anti-Catholic animus rooted in the
political politics of the eighteenth century Enlightenment
and the cultural polemics of nineteenth century American
nativism have long since taken over all the traditional
themes: The church is an authoritarian monolith; its
doctrines are hopelessly premodern; its rites are colorful
but mindless; its sexual standards are unnatural,
repressive and hypocritical; its congregations are anti-
Semitic and racist; its priests are harsh and predatory; its
grip on the minds of believers is numbing.
Peter Steinfels, Beliefs: Of Bob Jones U., American Culture, and Anti-
Catholicism, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2000, at A13.
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about whether and to what extent anti-Catholicism inspired the
Blaine Amendments, not to neglect the possibility that much in the
American tradition of thinking and legislating about church-state
relations, religious freedom, and religion itself was a reaction to and
against the Roman Catholic Church.
At the same time, we ought also to avoid another mistake.
It is common in contemporary discussions of the Blaine
Amendments to refer to the "anti-Catholicism" behind these
provisions as "prejudice," "bias," or "bigotry." To be sure, such
labels are understandable and, in many cases, accurate. But they
can also mislead. Specifically, these labels make it too easy,
particularly in polite and well-educated circles, to dismiss without
reflection salient cultural facts and trends, and to avoid meaningful
engagement with influential contentions? 9 A "prejudice," after all,
is an "[i]rrational suspicion or hatred of a particular group, race, or
religion;" an "adverse judgment or opinion formed... without
knowledge or examination of the facts."80  Because few in
contemporary discourse are likely to thoughtfully unpack and
examine, let alone defend, prejudice, bias, or bigotry, there is the
risk that such epithets will serve more as convenient conversation
stoppers than as useful descriptions and starting points for
meaningful analysis. 1
78. See Steinfels, supra note 77 ("There is often an astonishing lack of
awareness about stereotypes of Catholicism").
79. Peter Steinfels observed, in the midst of the controversy a few years
ago about then-Governor George W. Bush's visit to South Carolina's Bob
Jones University, that there was something strange about the fact that right-
thinking people everywhere quickly and loudly condemned the University for
its alleged "anti-Catholicism," when, in fact, "[o]pposing anti-Catholicism in
the United States by denouncing Bob Jones is about as relevant to today's
reality as combating medical errors by condemning leeches and snake oil." Id.
80. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (Joseph P. Picket et al. eds., 4th ed. 2000),
http://www.bartleby.com/61.
81. See Berg, supra note 65, at 131-32 ("The term 'anti-Catholicism'
often has a normative judgment embedded in it: that a person's opposition to
Catholicism is an unjustified prejudice. Throughout this Article, however, I
use the term to describe any view that rests on a fear or distrust of
Catholicism, whether or not the view is justified").
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The anti-Catholicism running through American history,
law, and culture is not so easily reduced to widespread, irrational
dislike-or, as the Justices unhelpfully put it in Romer,S • , , 8 2
animus 
-toward Irish immigrants, Pope Pius IX, or Al Smith.
The Common School Movement, the Blaine Amendments, and
McCollum-style separationism reflected the views and vision of
many decent, liberal, and intelligent people." These were efforts,
82. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
83. Marc Stern's point is well taken:
It is often said that [the Blaine Amendments] reflect anti-
Catholic prejudices of the Protestant majority. Indeed
they did, surely in tone, and, in some measure, in
substance as well. Some of that rhetoric, many of the
fears, and some of the resulting legislation is nothing less
than an embarrassing relic of outdated religious bigotry.
But twentieth century Americans make the mistake of
measuring the import of that anti-Catholic response
against the post-Vatican It Catholic Church, a church
which, under the influence of the American Jesuit, John
Courtney Murray, has accepted the validity of church
state separation. That was not the nineteenth century
Roman Catholic Church, whose leaders vigorously
opposed the separation idea as a dangerous, even
heretical, doctrine. The Protestant reaction must be
judged against that reality.
Marc D. Stern, School Vouchers: The Church-State Debate that Really Isn't, 31
CONN. L. REV. 977, 987 (1999). I would add to Mr. Stern's observation the
friendly amendment that the Catholic Church had, of necessity, been
struggling for "church state separation" long before Murray, and the pre-
Vatican II "reality" to which Protestants reacted was considerably more
complicated than Mr. Stern describes or Nineteenth Century Protestants
appreciated. In fact, and notwithstanding the Holy See's frequent criticisms of
the aggressively anti-clerical and anti-Catholic brand of liberalism with which
the Roman Catholic Church was contending in Europe, Catholics in the
United States throughout the nineteenth century tended-with some
exceptions, to be sure-to campaign not for domination of American life and
politics, but instead merely for evenhanded treatment. See, e.g., HAMBURGER,
supra note 28, at 210 n.36 (quoting Orestes Brownson, The Know-Nothings,
BROWNSON'S Q. REv., Jan. 1855, at 117) ("[The Church's] wish is to pursue
her spiritual mission in peace, and keep aloof from politics, so long as they
leave her the opportunity.")). New York's Bishop John Hughes expressed
passionately what appears to have been the frustration of many American
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however clumsy and boorish in some cases, to translate into law
certain arguments and commitments regarding the meaning of
citizenship, democracy, freedom, religious faith, and education.
That American Protestants often misunderstood Catholicism, and
labored under mistakes about Catholic doctrine, practice, and
history, does not change the fact that many strongly disagreed with,
and were not merely "biased" against, the Catholic Church. As
many Americans understood it, the Church had certain aims, and it
made certain claims about things that matter. And, as many
Americans understood it, these claims were false, these aims were
dangerously un-American, and they needed to be resisted." To be
clear: Americans' widely shared opinions and fears of Catholicism
Catholics:
The man must be blind to clear evidence, who does not
see the existence of a dark conspiracy, having for its
ultimate object, to make the Presbyterian Church the
dominant religion of this country.... Under the pretense
of solicitude for the preservation of CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY, the Catholics are to be robbed of both.
HAMBURGER, supra note 28, at 214 n.52; see also JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY,
WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON THE AMERICAN
PROPOSITION 67 (1960) (distinguishing American constitutionalism from the
"system against which the Church waged its long-drawn-out fight in the
nineteenth century, namely, Jacobinism[,]" and noting that "the Church
opposed the 'separation of church and state' of the sectarian Liberals because
in theory and in fact it did not mean separation at all but perhaps the most
drastic unification of church and state which history as known").
84. McConnell, supra note 23, at 459 (2000) ("[Ilt is important to
recognize that the establishmentarians of this earlier era were not merely
narrow-minded bigots. They had genuine reasons for fearing that the moral
and cultural underpinnings of Americanism were endangered by the influx of
strangers to these shores.").
85. Harper's Weekly warned, for example, that "the primary object of the
Roman party is not the education of the children, but the maintenance and
extension of the Roman sect. The plan is to make the schools nurseries of
Roman Catholicism-a plan which every good citizen should strenuously
oppose." The Parochial Schools, HARPER'S WKLY., Apr. 10, 1875, at 294. And,
in the 1940s, the "ferocity" with which liberals opposed aid to parochial schools
reflected "a desire to create a common culture in the midst of totalitarian foes,
as well as a conviction that hierarchical religious institutions undermined the
individual autonomy necessary for a healthy commonweal." McGreevy, supra
note 66, at 130.
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reflected a culture that for centuries was saturated with the
polemics and rhetorical excesses of anti-"popery," with a
thoroughly Protestant version of English and European history, and
with religious individualism and anti-clericalism. Still, we should
not be too quick to dismiss as "bigoted" the decision to take the
Church seriously enough to oppose it.
III.
The Blaine Amendments, like much else in the American
experience, were anti-Catholic, but they are best understood as
more than just that. These provisions should be confronted not
only as historical artifacts, as evidence of long-dead biases, or as the
latest hurdles in voucher related litigation. Instead, they should
also be engaged as moves in important and ongoing arguments
about faith, authority, and democracy; about what it means, and
what is required, to be a citizen; and about the roles of education
and religion in shaping the kind of citizen that our constitutional
order requires. Today, the Blaine Amendments are at the center of
the education reform debate, and are engaged primarily as
obstacles to school voucher programs. But if we step back briefly
from the arena of school-choice litigation, we can see that these
provisions are also part of a long and continuing effort to harness
and employ effectively the process and content of education for the
purpose of generating a certain kind of citizen and a certain kind of
polity.
Indeed, this effort is the focus of a rich and growing
scholarly literature on "civic education," and on the challenges
posed by religious faith, teachings, and communities to certain
conceptions of political liberalism." Prominent thinkers argue
86. For a few recent and leading contributions to the discussion, see, e.g.,
BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE LIBERAL STATE (1980);
STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE DISSENT OF THE GOVERNED: A MEDITATION ON
LAW, RELIGION, AND LOYALTY 35 (1998); AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC
EDUCATION (1987); MEIRA LEVINSON, THE DEMANDS OF LIBERAL
EDUCATION (1999); STEPHEN MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST: CIVIC
EDUCATION IN A MULTICULTURAL DEMOCRACY (2000) [hereinafter
MACEDO, DIVERSITY & DISTRUST]; MAKING GOOD CITIZENS: EDUCATION
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today-as others did in the 1840s, 1870s, 1920s, and 1940s-that
even a liberal state committed to pluralism, tolerance, and diversity
cannot take for granted the existence and perpetuation of the
values required for its health and survival. As Professor (now
Judge) Michael McConnell puts it:
[A] liberal society is always at risk. One can
hope that the free institutions of civil society
will produce virtuous citizens, each in its own
way, and believe that the structure of liberal
pluralism will tend in that direction. But there
is no guarantee. Liberalism is vulnerable at its
foundations.8 7
McConnell contends that the authentically liberal response
to this vulnerability is to protect and rely upon the norm-generating
capacity of families, private associations, and civil society." Others
AND CIVIL SOCIETY (Diane Ravitch et al. eds. 2001); MORAL AND POLITICAL
EDUCATION (Stephen Macedo et al. eds., American Society for Political and
Legal Philosophy, Nomos 43, 2002); William A. Galston, Civic Education in
the Liberal State, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE (Nancy L. Rosenbaum
ed., 1989); Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto,
63 U. CHI. L. REv. 937 (1996); Michael W. McConnell, Multiculturalism,
Majoritarianisin, and Educational Choice: What Does Our Constitutional
Tradition Have to Say?, 1991 UNIV. CHI. LEGAL F. 123.
87. McConnell, supra note 23, at 457-58; cf CARTER, supra note 86, at 35
("[A] religious community's efforts to transmit its understandings of the world
over time-to ensure the survival of its narrative-will often be most vital, and
also most at risk, in the education of the community's children").
88. Professor McConnell has put it well:
America's founders appreciated that republican
government would require public virtue, and that public
virtue requires the underpinnings of religion and morality.
But they also realized that America was too diverse to
permit agreement on religious fundamentals and, thus,
that an attempt to establish an official church would
produce division and discord. The great solution to the
republican problem was to promote public virtue
indirectly, by protecting freedom of speech, association,
and religion, and leaving the nation's communities of
belief free to inculcate their ideas of the good life, each in
their own way. To attempt to direct and control this
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insist, however, that it is sometimes the task of public, "civic"
education to inculcate and shore up liberal values by countering the
possibly illiberal influence on young people of churches, families,
associations, ethnic traditions, and other particularistic institutions.
In other words, there appears to be increasing skepticism
concerning what might once have been a core tenet of liberalism-
namely, the idea that it is neither the task nor the right of the liberal
state, through its schools or other instrumentalities, to tend to
citizens' values or instill particular notions of the good. To many,
liberalism today is at risk from the rival values being promoted by
religious fundamentalists and other allegedly intolerant subgroups,
in the same way that Republican virtue and national cohesion were
once threatened by European immigrants and authoritarian
Catholicism. In the face of these dangers, the argument goes, a
commitment to liberal democracy requires that we tend to political
ends as well as processes, that we "think very broadly about how
liberal citizens become capable of their great office[,]"" and that we
do so openly through a transforming process of civic education.
This is not a new argument. What is more, the civic
education debate was long inseparable from the respectable anti-
Catholicism of America's judicial and intellectual elites. The hopes
of Horace Mann and his successors to forge a cohesive and engaged
citizenry in the crucible of government education went hand in
hand with their aggressive Protestantizing, and later secularizing,
aspirations. The conclusion of an 1854 decision in Maine, affirming
the dismissal of a lawsuit brought by a fifteen year old girl who was
process-to establish a new public orthodoxy through the
noncoercive powers of government-will not succeed,
because it cannot. In a pluralistic society, such as ours,
common values are not determined by central authorities,
but emerge from the overlapping consensus of free
private associations.
McConnell, supra note 23, at 475. In a similar vein, Professor Galston has
argued recently for a liberal politics that would tolerate and protect diversity,
and permit illiberalism in the private sphere, while still defending those core
commitments necessary for a functioning democracy. See generally GALSTON,
supra note 23.
89. MACEDO, DIVERSITY & DISTRUST, supra note 86, at 275.
FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW
expelled from her public school for refusing to read the King James
Version of the Bible, illustrates vividly these aspirations. After
stating that "[t]he education of the people is... a matter of public
concern, and of... paramount importance," the court went on to
note:
Large masses of foreign population are among
us, weak in the midst of our strength. Mere
citizenship is of no avail, unless they imbibe the
liberal spirit of our laws and institutions, unless
they become citizens in fact as well as in name.
In no other way can the process of assimilation
be so readily and thoroughly accomplished as
through the medium of the public schools.9
Thus, as Professor John Coons has written, "[t]he
machinery of public monopoly" was chosen specifically by
"brahmins ... to coax the children of immigrants from the religious
superstitions of their barbarian parents." 91 To those inclined to
doubt civil society's ability to nurture the values required for a free
and democratic polity, the villain was clear: Writing in 1949, but
speaking in this respect for his Common School forebears, Paul
Blanchard warned that the Catholic parochial school was "the most
important divisive instrument in the life of American children."
92
90. Donohoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379, 391, 413 (1854). The Donohoe
court's worries were repeated, thirty five years later, in testimony before
Congress, by an opponent of parochial schools, who insisted that the "task of
absorbing and Americanizing these foreign masses can only be successfully
overcome by a uniform system of American schools, teaching the same
political creed." GLENN, supra note 55, at 252.
91. Coons, supra note 6, at 19 ("Today that antique machinery continues
its designated role, and if this function was ever benign, it has long since
ceased to be so.").
92. PAUL BLANCHARD, AMERICAN FREEDOM AND CATHOLIC POWER 67
(1949); see also MACEDO, DIVERSITY & DISTRUST, supra note 86, at 132
(noting the "incompatibility of Catholicism and the republican civic aims" of
"early common schooling"); id. at 88 ("It is too simple to say that the early
common schools were in the business of 'Protestantizing' Catholic
immigrants.... To a significant degree, the common schools represented a
shared civic vision. Convergence on that vision could not.., be taken for
granted."); cf McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 640 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) ("The mere fact that a purpose of the Establishment Clause is to
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In all fairness, however, it is difficult to criticize liberal
theorists, past and present, for worrying about the "reproduction"
of the values, habits, and attitudes thought necessary for life in and
service to the liberal state.93 These thinkers have a point: the liberal
state can no more perpetuate itself without attending carefully to
the dispositions of its citizens than a religious community that does
not evangelize each new generation can hope to thrive and
survive.94  In the words of the father of the Common School
Movement, Horace Mann, "it may be an easy thing to make a
republic; but it is a very laborious thing to make Republicans." 95 In
this vein, Henry Adams once complained that education is "a sort
of dynamo machine for polarizing the popular mind; for turning
and holding its lines of force in the direction supposed to be the
most effective for State purposes.,
96
Was Adams right? Is "polarizing the popular mind," or
what Professor Amy Gutmann has called "conscious social
reduce or eliminate religious divisiveness or strife, does not place religious
discussion, association, or political participation in a status less preferred than
rights of discussion, association, and political participation generally.").
93. GUTMANN, supra note 86, at 39 ("We are committed to collectively re-
creating the society that we share .... The substance of this core commitment is
conscious social reproduction.").
94. See MACEDO, DIVERSIrY & DISTRUST, supra note 86, at 278-79 ("We
should not take for granted a shared civic life robust enough to master the
many centrifugal forces to which modern life gives rise."); William A. Galston,
Expressive Liberty, Moral Pluralism, Political Pluralism: Three Sources of
Liberal Theory, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 869, 870 (1999) ("Liberal democratic
citizens are made, not born.. .. "); cf. McConnell, supra note 23, at 458.
In light of this vulnerability, it is not surprising that
establishmentarianism also has its advocates. It is
tempting to say that the government should take a more
direct role in the inculcation of public virtue. Such an
important matter should not be left to chance, or to the
market, or to the private sphere.
Id.
95. CARTER, supra note 86, at 42 (quoting Horace Mann, The
Importance of Universal, Free, Public Education (1867), available in 1 THE
PEOPLE SHALL JUDGE: READINGS IN THE FORMATION OF AMERICAN POLICY
589 (Univ. of Chi. ed., 1949)).
96. HENRY ADAMS, THE EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS: AN
AUTOBIOGRAPHY 78 (Popular ed., Houghton Mifflin 1927).
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reproduction," what education really is and is for? Certainly,
Justices of the United States Supreme Court have assumed as
much.97  Professor Stephen Macedo, one of the leading
contemporary civic education theorists, agrees: "Public schools"
are, for him, "instruments for the most basic and controversial of
civic ends[,] ... [t]he project of creating citizens."9
The Blaine Amendments can also helpfully be framed as
arguments proceeding from Macedo's, and Adams's, premises. In
other words, it was the question, "what should be the purpose, and
content, of 'education'?" that was-along with a colorful grab-bag
of fears, misunderstandings, biases, and conspiracy theories-that
was at the heart of the Blaine Amendment controversies and that
remains a central problem of political morality today. Although we
confront the Blaine Amendments today primarily as constraints
imposed by positive law on local policy choices about school
funding, these provisions take us to the heart of perennial questions
about both statecraft and soulcraft. That is, the Blaine
Amendments represent, among other things, the enactment into
law of certain claims about the aims of education, the prerogatives
of the liberal state, the proper scope of religious obligation, and
even the nature and end of the human person.99 We should engage
these claims.
For example: I believe that education is "the indivisible
process of acquiring beliefs, premises, and dispositions that are our
windows on the world, that mediate and filter our experience of it,
and that govern our evaluation and judgment of it. Education is
97. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986)
(noting that the objective of public education is the inculcation of
"'fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political
system'" (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979)). But see
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943)
("There is no mysticism in the American concept of the State or of the nature or
origin of its authority.... Authority here is to be controlled by public opinion,
not public opinion by authority.").
98. MACEDO, DIVERSITY & DISTRUST, supra note 86, at ix.
99. See Michael A. Scaperlanda, Producing Trousered Apes in Dwyer's
Totalitarian State, 7 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 175, 219 (2002) (noting that the
"purpose of education is to fashion a new human being") (quoting LUIGI
GuIssANI, THE RISK OF EDUCATION 80 (2001)).
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what attaches us to those goods and ends that attract, almost
gravitationally, our decisions and actions."' °  As the French
philosopher Jacques Maritain once wrote, "the chief task of
education is above all to shape man, or to guide the evolving
dynamism through which man forms himself as man."' ' In fact,
Pope John Paul II goes so far as to suggest that the educator is "a
person who 'begets' in a spiritual sense"'2 and that education
should "be considered a genuine apostolate,"'0 3 or mission. Indeed,
it is precisely because education is the process and craft of soul
making, and is as much about transmitting values and loyalties to
our children as it is about outfitting them with useful data and skill
sets, that we care, argue, and even fight so much about it. This is
why today's debates concerning choice-based reform are as heated
as they are, why the Common School Movement was so widely
embraced, why the Blaine Amendments were enacted, and why
Paul Blanchard and Justice Douglas worried about Catholic
schools. As those involved in the civic education conversation
recognize, we care about education not just because we think it
matters what facts and figures our children and our fellow citizens
know. We care also because it matters what they value, it matters
what and in what they believe, and it matters to and for what they
aspire. This is, of course, why many of us cherish the right to send
our children to religious schools, and also why many in the 19th
Century, like more than a few today, feared the political effects of
its exercise.
100. Garnett, Henry Adams, supra note *, at 1846.
101. JACQUES MARITAIN, EDUCATION AT THE CROSSROADS 1 (1943). At
first, Maritain sounds here not unlike the authors of the Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), mystery passage, who celebrated the development of
a certain kind of agent, an autonomous and unencumbered self capable of
determining for himself the meaning of life and the mystery of the Universe. See
id. at 851 (joint opinion). It is worth noting too, though, that in the opinion of
these Justices, "[b]eliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State." Id. at 851.
102. Pope John Paul II, Letter to Families 16 (1994), available at
http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/john-paul-ii/letters/documentshf jp-
ii-let.02021994_familiesen.html.
103. Id.
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CONCLUSION
The Blaine Amendments are best understood in the context
of long-running public debates about Catholicism's compatibility
with American democracy and the fitness of Roman Catholics for
American citizenship. °4 These provisions embodied, among other
things, the argument that Catholic schools were unlikely to
inculcate the kind of values and produce the kind of persons
required for the success of the American experiment. As my
colleague Professor McGreevy has observed, though, "concerns
that Catholicism-or any religion-improperly prepares its
adherents for democratic life risks becoming a theological claim."'0 5
This is an important and profound observation. I will close, then,
with the suggestion that the Blaine Amendments are best
understood, and might most profitably be engaged, not simply as
rules of positive law, but as theological arguments about the nature,
content, and scope of religious belief, truth, and obligation.
In a similar vein, more than fifty years ago, in the wake of
the Everson and McCollum decisions, John Courtney Murray
lamented, vividly, that "[t]he First Amendment has been stood on
its head. And in that position it cannot but gurgle juridical
nonsense."'1 6 He went on to argue provocatively that the version of
strict-separationism the Justices embraced in those decisions-and
that is preserved in many of the Blaine Amendments-is not only
bad constitutional law, but also represents both an "irredeemable
piece of sectarian dogmatism."'' 7  The celebrated "wall of
separation," according to Murray, represents "a religious absolute,
104. John Courtney Murray once quipped, "The question [whether
Catholicism is compatible with American democracy] is invalid as well as
impertinent; for the manner of its position inverts the order of values. It
must.., be turned round to read, whether American democracy is compatible
with Catholicism." MURRAY, supra note 83, at ix-x.
105. McGreevy, supra note 66, at 131; cf McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618,
640-41 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring) (insisting that the government may not
"treat religion and those who teach or practice it, simply by virtue of their
status as such, as subversive of American ideals").
106. Murray, supra note 52, at 23.
107. Id. at 30; see also MURRAY, supra note 83, at 48-56 (discussing the
"theologies of the First Amendment").
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a sectarian idea of religion" that proceeds from a "theological
premise"; the "wall... is built, not by an idea of liberty, but by an
idea of religion."108
It strikes me that Professor Hamburger's recent history
provides strong support for Murray's arguments."9 Hamburger's
work makes a strong case that the notion of "separation of church
and state," as it has developed and been implemented in the United
States, and as it was codified in many States' Blaine Amendments,
is as much a cluster of substantive religious tenets than an "article[]
of peace". n This notion of "separation" has served not only as a
neutral means of clearing out the space in life and law required for
the freedoms of belief and conscience and guaranteeing the
independence of religious associations and institutions. It has
functioned also as a profession of faith, a body of doctrine, and a
cluster of highly individualistic assertions about religious belief,
authority, obligation, and truth."' It is not only a claim about
108. Murray, supra note 52, at 30.
109. See, e.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 28, at 489 ("[T]he idea of
separation between church and state seems to have been part of a
reconceptualization of religious liberty that had particular appeal for
Americans who conceived of themselves as independent of clerical and
ecclesiastical claims of authority."). As Professor Hamburger further
recounts:
Gradually, in response to their fears of church authority,
especially Catholic Church authority, Americans
reconceptualized their religion, their citizenship, and their
sense of themselves in highly individualistic ways, and,
concomitantly, they redefined their religious liberty to
protect themselves from the groups they feared, making
separation of church and state part of their broader
reconception of their individual, religion, and national
identity.
Id. at 490.
110. MURRAY, supra note 83, at 49. In Murray's view, the First
Amendment's Religion Clauses ought to be regarded as "articles of peace,"
not "articles of faith." Id. They were "the work of lawyers, not theologians or
even of political theorists," and reflected the "necessity or utility for the
preservation of the public peace." Id. at 56-57.
111. See id. at 48-49 ("[T]here are those who read into [the First
Amendment] certain ultimate beliefs, certain specifically sectarian tenets with
regard to the nature of religion, religious truth, the church, faith, conscience,
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religion; it is also-a religious claim.
The suggestion that the Blaine Amendments are the
codifications of particular, contestable theological assertions is no
doubt unsettling. I neither purport nor intend to explore it fully
112here. Still, let us assume, for present purposes, that the claim is
plausible. If we approach the Blaine Amendments not as school
funding experiments but as endorsements of particular religious
arguments as well as constitutionalized rejections of others,"3 what
then?
It is tempting to proceed from this characterization of the
Blaine Amendments as codified sectarian dogma to the conclusion
that they are unconstitutional. Putting aside the question whether
the circumstances surrounding their enactments makes these
provisions vulnerable under, for example, the Equal Protection
Clause,"' it is black-letter doctrine that the Constitution does not
permit government to propose, endorse, evaluate, or enforce
theological claims,"5 just as it is a staple of contemporary church-
divine revelation, human freedom, etc... They are true articles of faith"); see
also id. at 50 (attributing dogmatic separationism, in part, to the "Puritan"
"notion that American democratic institutions are the necessary secular
reflection of Protestant anti-authoritarian religious individualism"); PERRY,
supra note 49, at 30 (contending that certain separationist claims "import into
the Constitution a controversial conception of the proper relation between
morality and religion," a conception that is, "in a word, sectarian and has no
claim on the large majority of Americans for whom religious faith and moral
judgment are often inextricably linked").
112. Of course, as my friend Steve Smith once reminded me, "nearly
everything of any lasting significance is at some level a theological position."
Email from Steven D. Smith to Richard W. Garnett (June 10, 2003, 15:28:56
EST) (on file with author); see also, e.g., PERRY, supra note 49, at 50-51, 109
(arguing that the moral claim at the heart of liberalism-i.e., the claim that
every human being, by virtue of being human, is inviolable-is, at bottom, a
religious claim).
113. Cf RICHARD J. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION
AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 82 (1984) ("Because government cannot help
but make moral judgments of an ultimate nature, it must, if it has in principle
excluded identifiable religion, make those judgments by 'secular' reasoning
that is given the force of religion.").
114. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 4, at 968-69.
115. See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 609 (1976) (courts may not
"4pass on questions of religious doctrine"); Andrew Koppelman, Secular
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state law that the "Establishment Clause is infringed when the
government makes adherence to religion relevant to a person's
standing in the political community."''" Indeed, we are often told
that "if there is one thing that the First Amendment forbids with
resounding force it is the intrusion of a sectarian philosophy of
religion into the fundamental law of the land. '' 11 Justice Robert
Jackson, in ringing terms and with characteristic flair, went even
further:
[F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that
do not matter much. That would be a mere
shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is
the right to differ as to things that touch the
heart of the existing order.
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty,
can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or
act their faith therein."8
How, then, can the Blaine Amendments, to the extent they
are prescriptions of religious orthodoxy, be sustained?
Purpose, 88 VIRG. L. REv. 87, 108 (2002) (arguing that the "Establishment
Clause forbids the state from declaring religious truth").
116. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
the judgment); see also MURRAY, supra note 83, at 54 ("If it be true that the
First Amendment is to be given a theological interpretation and that therefore it
must be 'believed,' made an object of religious faith, it would follow that a
religious test has been thrust into the Constitution.").
117. Murray, supra note 52, at 30. In Michael Perry's words, the
Establishment Clause means:
[g]overnment may not take any action that favors a
church in relation to another church, or in relation to no
church at all, on the basis of the view that the favored
church is, as a church-as a community of faith-better
along one or another dimensions of value (truer, for
example, or more efficacious spiritually, or more
authentically American).
PERRY, supra note 49, at 24.
118. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624,642 (1943).
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The problem with the assertion that the Blaine Amendments
are unconstitutional because they codify religious propositions is that
Justice Jackson's celebrated tribute to the "fixed star in our
constitutional constellation" falls apart under close inspection.
Indeed, as Steve Smith argues, Jackson's "no orthodoxy" principle
"committed the Court (and the judges and lawyers and scholars, and
indeed the nation) to a massive collective delusion."'1 9 Of course, the
government "prescribe[s]" orthodoxy-of a kind that can fairly be
described as "religious"-all the time. Assertions to the contrary are
"radically incongruent with our constitutional traditions."12° The
government consciously and purposely articulates positions, stakes
claims, and take stands; it approves, endorses, and subsidizes some
controversial and contestable ideas, and rejects others. Indeed, our
government, in particular, was founded upon, and dedicated to,
certain ideas and propositions.
It should come as no surprise, then, that-as was described in
Part III-many believe it is a necessary task of the state in a liberal
democracy like ours precisely to "prescribe[]" orthodoxy, through
the education of the young as well as by other means, so as to shore
up the values and form the citizens it requires. In particular, it
119. Steven D. Smith, Barnette's Big Blunder 1 (unpublished manuscript
on file with author); see also id. at 4 ("[T]he 'no orthodoxy' position
memorably articulated in Barnette has had a beguiling but baneful influence
on our First Amendment discourses-and hence on our understanding of our
community, and of ourselves.").
120. Id. at 14; see also id. at 18 ("A government must act, and hence it
must act on some set of beliefs; so government could hardly avoid endorsing
the beliefs it acts upon.").
121. Michael McConnell has argued, in contrast, that "it is difficult or
impossible for a liberal state to engage in the direct inculcation of public virtue
without compromising its liberal commitment to neutrality among the
different and competing reasonable worldviews of the society." McConnell,
supra note 23, at 455. He warns, also, that "[e]stablishmentarianism is neither
liberal in theory nor successful in practice." Id. at 475. In my view, it is true
both that our government does prescribe "orthodoxy" (and, indeed, could
hardly do otherwise), and that the "new establishmentarianism" described by
McConnell is illiberal (i.e., inconsistent with liberal premises) and normatively
unsound. See generally, e.g., Garnett, Henry Adams, supra note *. As Steve
Smith points out, though, the better response to the "new
establishmentarianism" might not be to assert that government may not
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seems that arguments for, or constitutional provisions protecting,
religious freedom will, in the end, rest on foundational and
122
anthropological claims that can fairly be characterized as religious.
As Dean John Garvey succinctly put it, the freedom of religion is
protected by our laws because "religion is important" and because
"the law thinks religion is a good thing."
1
If this is true, then we have reached a strange place in our
consideration of the Blaine Amendments. It turns out that these
purportedly secular, separationist, and religion-neutral provisions
are, in fact, religious, even sectarian, arguments about the meaning,
nature, and spheres of religious liberty and religion itself.12 Still,
although I believe that some of these provisions, and some of their
applications, run afoul of present-day constitutional doctrine, this is
not why. Yes, the Blaine Amendments "prescribe orthodoxy" in
religion, but-liberal protestations to the contrary notwithstanding-
they could hardly do otherwise. Arguments about religious freedom
121
and church-state relations are, ultimately, religious arguments.
prescribe orthodoxy, but to "consider or criticize the substance of what [the
establishmentarians] would have the community stand for." Smith, supra note
119, at 54.
122. I am grateful to Tom Berg for reminding me of this possibility. For
an explication of Berg's view, see, for example, Thomas C. Berg, Religion
Clause Anti-Theories, 72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 693 (1997). For some different
views, see generally John H. Garvey, Free Exercise and the Values of Religious
Liberty, 18 CONN. L. REv. 779, 798, 801 (1986) (contending that we rightly
protect the free exercise of religion because "religion is a lot like insanity" and
that "[w]e protect [religious claimants'] freedom.., because they are not
free"); and Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL IssuEs 313, 316-19 (1996) (setting out a "religion-neutral case for
religious liberty").
123. JoHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 42,57(1996).
124. Cf. Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in
Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 149, 150 (1991) (suggesting that
the "internal, self-negating quality of our commitment to religious freedom
renders us incapable of interpreting and applying that commitment in a
coherent fashion").
125. The principal historical justification for our constitutional
commitment to religious freedom was a religious
rationale. The justification relied upon religious premises
and worked within a religious world view. Moreover,
quite apart from its historical significance, the religious
83
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Maybe we should welcome this conclusion. Perhaps, instead
of ignoring the Blaine Amendments' religious meaning, or treating it
as a constitutional strike against them, we could use the possibility
that separationism is theology to enrich our conversations, not only
about the Amendments, but also and more generally about
education, citizenship, religious freedom. After all, if the Blaine
Amendments are not merely legal constraints on statute
legislatures' funding options, but also claims about the content and
proper sphere of religious beliefs, obligations, and loyalties, then it
would seem perfectly appropriate to raise constructive, yet
unapologetic and unbracketed, religious counterclaims about these
121
matters in response. It would seem perfectly appropriate to
propose, for example, that the "right of the human person to
religious freedom"1 27 "has its foundation in the very dignity of the
human person as is known through the revealed word of God and
by reason itself.'
128
justification is also the most satisfying, and perhaps the
only adequate justification for a special constitutional
commitment to religious liberty.
See id. at 149.
126. For arguments that religious believers ought not to be required to
censor or bracket their religious beliefs when participating in politics and
public life, see generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF
(1993); NEUHAUS, supra note 113; and PERRY, supra note 49.
127. Second Vatican Council, supra note 50, 1 2.
12& Id.
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